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Abstract In this paper, we investigate the prison’s dilemma game with monte
carlo rule in the view of the idea of the classic Monte Carlo method on the
grid. Monte carlo rule is an organic combination of the current dynamic rules
of individual policy adjustment, which not only makes full use of information
but also reflects the individual’s bounded rational behavior and the ambiva-
lence between the pursuit of high returns and high risks. In addition, it also
reflects the individual’s behavioral execution preferences. The implementation
of monte carlo rule brings an extremely good result, higher cooperation level
and stronger robustness are achieved by comparing with the unconditional
imitation rule, replicator dynamics rule and fermi rule. When analyse the
equilibrium density of cooperators as a function of the temptation to defect,
it appears a smooth transition between the mixed state of coexistence of co-
operators and defectors and the pure state of defectors when enhancing the
temptation, which can be perfectly characterized by the trigonometric behav-
ior instead of the power-law behavior discovered in the pioneer’s work. When
discuss the relationship between the temptation to defect and the average
returns of cooperators and defectors, it is found that cooperators’ average re-
turns is almost a constant throughout the whole temptation parameter ranges
while defectors’ decreases as the growth of temptation. Additionally, the in-
sensitivity of cooperation level to the initial density of cooperators and the
sensitivity to the social population have been both demonstrated.
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1 Introduction
The cooperation among selfish individuals [1] such as Kin cooperation [2],
Mutually cooperation and Reputation-seeking cooperation [3], which are con-
trary to natural selection, are widely discovered in human society [4-6], having
already become one of the challenges of evolutionary game theory [7-9].
This phenomenon can be characterized by the prison’s dilemma game [10],
in which the individuals adopt one of two strategies: C (cooperation) or D
(defection). A selfish individual would select D as his strategy for the sake of
higher returns. Nevertheless, if both sides choose D simultaneously, each of
them will get less returns than those acquired for mutual cooperation.
Over the years, scholars often focus exclusively on the promotion of co-
operation on different spatial structures [11-13]. However, there are not many
researches on the dynamic rules of game individual policy adjustment. Dif-
ferent update rules often lead to different results. For example, Sysi-Aho et
al. [14] have modified a more rational updating rule on the basis of the re-
search of Harut and Doebeli [15], believing that the individuals have original
intelligence in the form of local decision-making rule deciding their strategies.
In this rule, individuals suppose their neighbors’ strategies retain unchanged
and aim at choosing a strategy to maximize their instant returns. This rule
results in the density of cooperator at equilibrium which differ tremendously
from those resulting from the replicator dynamics rule in the literature [15],
and the cooperation can persist throughout the whole temptation parameter
ranges. Li et al. [16] adopt the unconditional imitation rule used in the Nowak
and May’s work [17] to revise the regulation of replication dynamics owing
to its briefness and the ability of according with the psychology of most in-
dividuals. It is discovered that in some parameter ranges, the performance of
inhibiting cooperative behaviors originally turns to promoting. Xia et al. [18]
compare the effect on cooperation under unconditional imitation rule, replica-
tor dynamics rule and Moran process [19] respectively, discovering that Moran
process promotes cooperation much more than the others. Those facts affirm
the status of update rules in the evolution of cooperative behavior.
In the existing research, the dynamic rules of game individual strategy
adjustment are mainly unconditional imitation rule, replicator dynamics rule
and fermi rule [20]. However, replicator dynamics and fermi rule can not make
full use of the game information while unconditional imitation rule can not tol-
erate individuals’ irrational behavior. An excellent update rule that simulates
individual policy updates more perfectly needs to be discovered.
In this paper we propose monte carlo rule, which is an organic combination
of the current dynamic rules of individual policy adjustment, not only making
full use of information but also reflecting the individual’s bounded rational be-
havior and the ambivalence between the pursuit of high interest and high risk
[21,22]. In addition, it also reflects the individual’s behavioral execution pref-
erences [23,24]. We analyse the effect on cooperative level under monte carlo
rule and verify its robustness. Further, we analyse the equilibrium density of
cooperator as a function of the temptation to defect and use trigonometric
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curves to characterize it. It is confirmed that the trigonometric fitting effect is
better than the power-law fitting in the pioneer’s work [20]. We also investi-
gate the relationship between temptation to defect and the average returns of
cooperators and defectors. Additionally, the insensitivity of cooperation level
to the initial density of cooperators and the sensitivity to the social population
have been both demonstrated by numerical simulation.
2 Prison’s dilemma game model with monte carlo rule
The prison’s dilemma represents a class of game models that its Nash equilib-
rium only falls on the non-cooperation. In this game model, each individual can
adopt one of two strategies C (cooperation) and D (defection). The returns
depend on the strategy of both sides. Enormous temptation forces rational
individuals to defect. However, if both sides choose the strategy of D simul-
taneously, each of them will get less returns than those acquired for mutual
cooperation.
Game individuals are located on the nodes of the grid, and the edges indi-
cate the connections between one individual and another. Along the footsteps
of Nowak et al. [25], the game returns can be simplified as the matrix below:
Cooperate Defect
Cooperate 1 0
Defect b 0
Where parameter b characterizes the interests of the temptation to defect
(1 < b ≤ 2). The larger the value of b, the greater the temptation of defection
to the individuals.
Individuals gain returns by playing prisoner’s dilemma game with their
nearest neighbors. During the evolutionary process, each individual adopts
one of neighbors’ strategies whose returns is more than or equal to himself’s
in the way of roulette, or just insists the original strategy:
P (si ← sj) = Uj
U0 +
d∑
k=1
ω(i, k)Uk
, j = 0, 1, 2, ..., d (1)
Where U0 represents individual’s own returns and U1, ..., Ud represent the re-
turns of the nearest neighbors respectively, d expressing the dimension of the
rule network (that is, d=4 in this paper) and P (si ← sj) showing the proba-
bility that individual i would imitate j. ω(i, k) is a characteristic function:
ω(i, k) =
{
0 Ui > Uk,
1 Ui ≤ Uk.
(2)
Where Ui represents individual i’s returns and Uk (k = 1, 2, ..., d) represents
the returns of individual k who is one of i’s neighbors.
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3 Results and Discussions on Simulation Experiment
For the sake of investigating the influence of spatial structure to cooperative
behavior, we apply classical Mean Field Theory [26] which is insensitive to the
topology, to preliminary predict the density of cooperators characterized by ρ.
Under this circumstance, the average returns of cooperators can be expressed
as:
UC = dρ (3)
Where d characterizes the dimension of the rule network. In the same way, the
average returns of defectors can be expressed as:
UD = bdρ (4)
Where the b characterizes the temptation to defect.
Following the monte carlo rule, we have obtained the differential equation
of ρ:
∂ρ
∂t
= (1− ρ)W (D ← C)− ρW (C ← D)
= −ρ(1− ρ) d · UD
d(1− ρ)UD + (1 + dρ)UC
= −ρ(1− ρ) 1
1− ρ+ ρ
b
+
1
bd
(5)
Where W (D ← C) indicates the probability that a defector transforms into
a cooperator and W (C ← D) indicates the probability that a cooperator
transforms into a defector. t is the game round.
On the basis of the differential equation, it turns out that as the game
progresses, the density of the cooperator (ρ) decreases monotonically until it
approaches 0, that is, all the cooperators would go extinct (dotted line in Fig.
1). However, in the space rule networks, cooperators can survive in the form of
clusters where they can get support from peers (solid line in Fig. 1), reaffirming
the positive role of spatial structure in cooperative behavior[16].
Table 1 A brief comparison of the four update rules in this paper.
Update strategy Information utilization Irrationality
unconditional imitation full not exists
replicator dynamics not full exists
fermi not full exists
monte carlo full exists
Similar to the unconditional imitation rule, monte carlo rule makes full use
of the the game information when compared with fermi rule and replicator
dynamics rule (Table 1). That is, during the policy update phase, individuals
would collect game information from all the neighbors to determine the most
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Fig. 1 Numerical simulation of cooperator density under monte carlo rule (solid line) at
b=1.10. The dotted line represents the well-mixed case obtained by Mean Field Theory in
the same parameter environment. Those data are simulated on grid of 100x100 where 50%
cooperators as well as 50% defectors are randomly distributed at the beginning, and 1000
simulations are averaged in each case.
satisfactory strategy in the next game round, instead of just randomly select-
ing a neighbor to decide whether to imitate or not. This behavior reflects the
rigor of individuals. Also, individual’s psychology of pursuing return growth
is reflected vividly in the monte carlo rule. Therefore, the game system under
the rule can support the germination of cooperation to a large extent. Figure
2 shows this fact: again the social population N=10000 and b=1.10, yet there
is only one very small cooperative group in the middle of the network at t=0,
cooperative behavior can still spread promptly. The middlemost subgraph in
Fig. 2 shows the track of function ρ(t), and other subgraphs display the distri-
bution of cooperators and defectors at several important simulate moments.
At the beginning, the small cooperative group spreads the cooperative behav-
ior in the form of clusters with irregular shapes. At the edge of the clusters,
the cooperators resist the temptation of the outside world through the support
of peers in the clusters. Owing to the protection of marginal cooperators, the
individuals within the clusters are undoubtedly the loyal defenders of coop-
eration. This model of mutual support enables cooperators to survive in the
society. As the game progresses, the rate of propagation continues to increase,
reaching the peak at around t=500. Then the rate is slowly reduced to 0,
achieving dynamic balance at around t=800. It is clearly that driven by the
idea of pursuing progress and full game information, the cooperative behavior
quickly spreads throughout the whole network.
Meanwhile, monte carlo strategy continues the inclusiveness of fermi rule
and moran process for irrational behavior [27]. It considers the individual’s
game returns as his fitness for the society, and the higher the game returns, the
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t=0 t=20 t=100
t=1000 ρ(t) t=200
t=800 t=600 t=400
Fig. 2 Snapshots of spatial distribution of cooperators (white boxes) and defectors (black
boxes) at t=0, 20, 100, 200, 400, 600, 800 and 1000 when there is only one very small
cooperative group in the center of the grid at the initial game moment. The middlemost
subgraph shows the track of function ρ(t), and the value of b is still set to be 1.10.
more the one can adapt to the society. In general, monte carlo rule is an organic
combination of the current dynamic rules of individual policy adjustment, so
that it not only makes full use of information, but also reflects the individual’s
bounded rational behavior and the ambivalence between the pursuit of high
interest and high risk.
Further, we investigate the role of update rules in the prisoner’s dilemma
game on the grid. In this paper, we mainly compare three classic update rules
with monte carlo rule: unconditional imitation rule, replicator dynamics rule
and fermi rule. Here, we briefly outline them:
1. Unconditional imitation rule: during the evolutionary process, the in-
dividual would compare his own returns with those of all the neighbors and
choose the game strategy with the highest returns as his strategy in next round
of game.
2. Replicator dynamics rule: during the evolutionary process, the individual
i randomly choose a neighbor j for returns comparison. If j’s game returns
Uj is greater than his own game returns Ui, the individual i would imitate j’s
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strategy with probability p in the next game round:
p =
Uj − Ui
D ·max(ki, kj) (6)
Where Ui, Uj represent the returns of individual i, j in the previous game
round respectively, and ki, kj are the number of neighbors they have. Parame-
ter D is the difference between the largest and the smallest parameters in the
game matrix (i.e. b).
3. Fermi rule: during the evolutionary process, the individual i randomly
choose a neighbor j for returns comparison, imitating j’s strategy with a cer-
tain probability which depends on the difference between the two:
p =
1
1 + e(Ui−Uj)/λ
(7)
where λ represents the noise effect according to the rationality of individuals.
Fig. 3 Numerical simulation of cooperator density under monte carlo rule (solid line),
replicator dynamics rule (circles), fermi rule (triangles) and unconditional imitation rule
(squares) on the grid at b=1.10. 1000 simulations are averaged in each case.
We takes λ=0.0625 in fermi rule for the reason that, in this case the track of
ρ(t) is closest to those under monte carlo rule with the guidance of Mean Field
Theory. This setting makes it more fair to compare the effects on cooperation
level. Since individuals cannot judge the priority of the two strategies at the
beginning, their initial strategies are all based on coin toss. That is, cooperators
and defectors occupy 50% of the grid, respectively. The result are showed in
Fig. 3. During the PD game, the ρ tends to be stable promptly. We observe that
the aggregate cooperation level between individuals is largely elevated under
unconditional imitation rule or monte carlo rule, when compared to fermi rule
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and replicator dynamics. It is clearly that update rules play an important role
in the evolutionary theory [19].
(a) R=4% UI MC
(b) R=6% UI MC
(c) R=11% UI MC
Fig. 4 The influence of defective invasions on society. White boxes represent cooperators
and black boxes represent defectors. Each row corresponds to the different number of defec-
tors (R), which are around 4%, 6%, 11% of the society, respectively. The first column shows
the strategic distribution when the invasion occurs, the second column shows the game equi-
librium results under the unconditional imitation rule, and the third column shows the game
equilibrium results under the monte carlo rule. N is set to be 10000 and b is set to be 1.10.
Although cooperation level under unconditional imitation rule is higher
than that of monte carlo rule, its mechanism of just imitating the best with-
out any hesitation makes individuals no longer consider any risks behind the
high-yields, so there is a reason to believe that it is not of robustness. To con-
firm this fact, we consider an extreme situation. All the individuals on the grid
are cooperators, and at some point, a group deliberately change its game strat-
egy (defect). After that, we simulate enough time steps for accommodation of
the defective invasion. The results are shown in Fig. 4. Each row corresponds
to the different number of defectors (R), which are around 4%, 6%, 11% of the
society, respectively. The first column shows the strategic distribution when
the invasion occurs, the second column shows the game equilibrium results
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under the unconditional imitation rule, and the third column shows the game
equilibrium results under the monte carlo rule. As the invasion of the defec-
tion, defectors’ neighbors did not hesitate to imitate the defective strategy
for higher returns under unconditional imitation, formed the defective core,
which could not update its own strategy, resulting in a significant reduction
in cooperation level. However, under monte carlo rule, individuals not only
seek for high returns, but also concern the high risks behind the high returns
and would make a balance between the two. So no matter how serious the
invasion, the cooperation will be balanced over time (ρ = 0.32), not extinct. It
is overwhelmingly clear that the robustness of monte carlo rule is significantly
better than unconditional imitation rule.
Next, we investigate the fraction of cooperators (ρ) as a function of the
temptation parameter (b) under monte carlo rule on the grid since ρ(b) is a
pretty meaningful quantity in evolutionary games. The results are showed in
Fig.5(a). The monte carlo rule always performs a cooperative society when
temptation is low. As b increases, the balanced pattern has been broke. On
the border, the internal support can not conquer the loss caused by defectors,
and the cluster begins to collapse layer by layer until a new balance appears.
The cooperators go extinct ultimately at b=1.31, for the reason that the huge
temptation prevents any form of clusters from overcoming the loss on the
border.
(a) ρ(b) (b) returns comparison
Fig. 5 (a) The effect of power law fitting (solid line), quadratic fitting (pluses) and trigono-
metric fitting (squares) on the curve ρ(b). For easy comparison, the original data expressed
by gray dots are also given in the figure. (b) The relationship between average returns of
individuals and the temptation parameter (b). 1000 simulations are averaged in each case.
According to Szabo’s outstanding work, the cooperator density data refer
to a power-law behavior in prisoner’s dilemma game under the fermi rule on
the grid, that is ρ ∝ (bcr − b)β [20], in which bcr is the threshold of the
disappearance of cooperation, once b > bcr, then all the cooperators would go
extinct. With the guidance of the goodness of fit (R) for nonlinear regression
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and Root Mean Squared Error (RMSE) displayed below:
R = 1− (
∑
(y − yˆ)2/
∑
y2)1/2 (8)
RMSE = ((
∑
(y − yˆ)2)/n)1/2 (9)
where y represents the original data, yˆ is on behalf of the fitting data, and n
is the length of y. We find that power-law fitting originally performing very
well under the fermi rule is unsatisfactory under monte carlo rule, which can
be seen in Fig.5(a). The solid line represents the best result of the power-law
fitting, where bcr=1.31 and β=0.923. After further observing the original data,
we choose quadratic and trigonometric curves to fit them. Their expressions
can be respectively indicated as:
y = ax2 + bx+ c and y = Asin(ωx+ ϕ) + d (10)
The fitting effects are also showed in Fig.5(a), and the specific fitting value can
be seen in Table 2. The pluses represent the result of quadratic fitting where the
most optimal parameter are a=-2.7363, b=4.8644 and c=-1.7205. The squares
represent trigonometric’s fitting effect where the best parameters are A=-
0.2568, w=7.2462, ϕ=-2.5603 and d=0.1314. The fitting effects of the two
are better than that of power-law fitting based on the smaller RMSE and the
better R. Furthermore, trigonometric fitting has a better result than quadratic
fitting, so we say that the cooperator density data refer to a trigonometric
behavior under the monte carlo rule on the grid, that is ρ ∝ Asin(ωx+ϕ) +d.
Table 2 The optimal solution of thr three fitting methods.
Fitting method Root Mean Squared Error Goodness of Fit
power-law 0.2608 0.9052
quadratic 0.0168 0.9356
trigonometric 0.0149 0.9428
We have also observed the relationship between average returns of indi-
viduals and the temptation parameter b. The results are showed in Fig.5(b).
Macroscopically, the strategy of cooperation is obviously better than defec-
tion due to the better returns. It is worth noting that the average returns of
cooperators is insensitive to the temptation parameter b. Furthermore, it is
surprised to find that the returns of the defectors decreases as the growth of
b, for the reason that excessive defectors gatherings have greatly reduced the
success of defection. It is clear that cooperation makes individuals live better
in society.
In the investigation above, we choose 50% as the initial density of coop-
erators (ρ0 = 0.5). In this section we would illustrate the effect of different
values of ρ0 on the cooperators density at equilibrium (ρ). Figure 6(a) shows
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(a) Sensitivity of ρ to ρ0 (b) Sensitivity of ρ to N
Fig. 6 (a) The numerical simulation results for the density of cooperator (ρ) as the game
progresses for different initial density of cooperator (ρ0) on the grid at b=1.10. From bottom
to top, the ρ0 is set to be 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8 and 0.99, respectively. (b) The numerical simulation
results for the density of cooperator (ρ) at equilibrium for different social population (N)
at b=1.10. 3000 simulations are averaged in each case.
the real-time fraction of cooperators (ρ(t)) for different initial cooperator den-
sities (ρ0). Those data obtained by taking the average value after 3000 times
through the same experiment are simulated on the grid of 100x100 at b=1.1
and N=10000. As we see, different value of ρ0 can only appreciably affect the
the time it takes for the game to reach equilibrium, but do not change the
fraction of cooperators at equilibrium. Thus we can say that the fraction of
cooperators at equilibrium is insensitive to the initial fraction of cooperators.
Finally, we investigate the effect of the social population (N) on cooper-
ation level. We fix b = 1.10 and ρ0 = 0.5, then change social population to
obtain corresponding fraction of cooperators at equilibrium. The results are
showed in Fig.6(b). For N ≥ 800, ρ does not depend on the social population.
However, for N ≤ 800, ρ decreases with smaller N . It is clear that a highly
cooperative society depends on a sufficient social population.
4 Conclusions
We introduce a new dynamic rule of game individual strategy adjustment,
that is, monte carlo rule and investigate the prison’s dilemma game under it
on the grid. Monte carlo rule not only promotes cooperative behavior, but also
has higher robustness when compared with unconditional imitation rule, repli-
cator dynamics rule and fermi rule. Under this rule, spatial structure plays a
positive role in cooperative behavior, and the equilibrium density of cooper-
ator as a function of the temptation to defect can be perfectly characterized
by the trigonometric behavior instead of the power-law behavior discovered in
the pioneer’s work under the fermi rule. The society obviously welcomes the
cooperation: cooperators can obtain higher and stabler returns than defectors
throughout the whole temptation parameter ranges. In addition, the coopera-
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tion level is insensitive to the initial density of cooperators but enough social
population is needed to maintain a high cooperation level.
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